（形势的发展表明各方都没有接受基辛格的“原则”和方案……）
据参考消息3月10日报道 美国前国务卿基辛格： 乌克兰不应成为东西方对抗前哨
【美国《华盛顿邮报》网站3月6日文章】题：乌克兰危机如何结束(作者美国前国务卿亨利・基辛格)
关于乌克兰问题的公开讨论全都谈到了对抗。大家过多地把乌克兰问题视作摊牌：乌克兰究竟加入东方还是西方。但是，如果乌克兰要继续存在并蓬勃发展，就绝对不能成为一方与另一方对抗的前哨。它应该充当双方之间的桥梁。
促进派别和解方为上策
俄罗斯必须认识到，如果迫使乌克兰成为卫星国，从而再次变动俄罗斯的边界，莫斯科就必定会重蹈历史的覆辙，陷入与欧洲和美国相互施压的自我实现的循环。
西方必须明白，对俄罗斯来说，乌克兰绝对不是简单的另一个国家。俄罗斯历史的开端是所谓的基辅罗斯公国，那里是俄罗斯宗教的发祥地。乌克兰在数百年的时间里是俄罗斯领土。它们的历史在那之前也紧密交织在一起。俄罗斯争取自由的战斗从1709年的波尔塔瓦战役开始，其中一些最重要的战役是在乌克兰领土上进行的。作为俄罗斯在地中海投射影响力的工具，黑海舰队按照长期租约驻扎在克里米亚的塞瓦斯托波尔。就连索尔仁尼琴和布罗茨基等知名持不同政见者都坚称，乌克兰是俄罗斯历史乃至俄罗斯这个国家不可分割的一部分。
欧盟必须意识到，在围绕乌克兰与欧盟关系展开谈判的过程中，其官僚主义的拖拉做派和把国内政治置于这个战略要素之上的做法使得谈判变成了危机。外交政策是一门确立优先重点的艺术。
乌克兰人是决定因素。他们所在的国家有着错综复杂的历史和语言构成。西部是斯大林和希特勒1939年瓜分战利品时并入苏联的。克里米亚有60%的人口是俄罗斯族人，直到1954年才并入乌克兰，是乌克兰裔的赫鲁晓夫为庆祝俄罗斯与哥萨克达成协议300周年而送给乌克兰的。西部大多信奉天主教；东部大多信奉俄罗斯东正教。西部讲乌克兰语；东部则大多讲俄语。乌克兰的任何一派如果试图支配另一派(以往就是这种模式)，最终就会导致内战或分裂。如果把乌克兰视作东西对抗的一部分，就会毁掉在今后数十年里把俄罗斯与西方(尤其是俄罗斯与欧洲)纳入国际合作体系的希望。
乌克兰只独立了23年，问题的根源在于，乌克兰政界人士试图把他们的意志强加于该国顽固对抗的部分，先是一个派别，后来又是另一个派别。这就是亚努科维奇及其主要政敌季莫申科之间冲突的实质。他们代表了乌克兰的两派，都不愿意分享权力。明智的美国对乌政策应该是设法让该国的两部分彼此合作。我们应该谋求和解，而不是让一个派别占据支配地位。
俄罗斯和西方都没有按照该原则行事，其中尤以乌克兰各派为甚。每一方都使形势雪上加霜。在多条边界不稳的情况下，如果俄罗斯强行采取军事解决办法，就会使自身遭到孤立。对西方来说，把普京妖魔化不是一项政策，而是缺少政策的托词。
普京应该逐渐意识到，无论他有什么样的不满，强行动武的政策都会导致又一场冷战。就美国而言，必须避免把俄罗斯视作需要耐心学习华盛顿确立的行为规则的异类。普京是以俄罗斯历史为前提的重要战略家。理解美国的价值观和心理不是他的强项。理解俄罗斯的历史和心理也不是美国决策者的强项。
寻求达成“平衡的不满意”
各方领导人应该回过头来检视结果，而不是争相摆出各种姿态。以下是我认为符合所有各方价值观和安全利益的结果：
1.乌克兰应该有权自由选择其经济和政治联盟，包括与欧洲的联盟。
2.乌克兰不应加入北约。7年前最后一次提出这个问题的时候，我就持这个立场。
3.乌克兰应该自由组建与民众表达的意愿相一致的政府。明智的乌克兰领导人随后应该在该国不同部分之间实施和解政策。在国际上，他们应该努力采取芬兰那样的姿态。该国明确宣示自身的绝对独立，在大多数领域与西方合作，但又小心避免对俄罗斯采取制度性的敌对态度。
4.俄罗斯吞并克里米亚不符合现有世界秩序的规则。不过，应该有可能把克里米亚与乌克兰的关系置于不太危险的基础之上。要实现这个目标，俄罗斯就得承认乌克兰对克里米亚的主权。乌克兰应该在国际观察员监督下举行的选举中加强克里米亚的自治。这个过程要包括消除关于驻塞瓦斯托波尔黑海舰队地位的所有不明确因素。
这些是原则，而不是处方。熟悉该地区的人士知道，并非以上所有原则都会得到各方认可。考验不在于绝对满意，而在于得到平衡的不满意。如果不能基于以上或类似原则达成某种解决方案，就会加速滑向对抗。那个时刻很快就会到来。
关于乌克兰问题的公开讨论全都谈到了对抗。大家过多地把乌克兰问题视作摊牌：乌克兰究竟加入东方还是西方。但是，如果乌克兰要继续存在并蓬勃发展，就绝对不能成为一方与另一方对抗的前哨。它应该充当双方之间的桥梁。
促进派别和解方为上策
俄罗斯必须认识到，如果迫使乌克兰成为卫星国，从而再次变动俄罗斯的边界，莫斯科就必定会重蹈历史的覆辙，陷入与欧洲和美国相互施压的自我实现的循环。
西方必须明白，对俄罗斯来说，乌克兰绝对不是简单的另一个国家。俄罗斯历史的开端是所谓的基辅罗斯公国，那里是俄罗斯宗教的发祥地。乌克兰在数百年的时间里是俄罗斯领土。它们的历史在那之前也紧密交织在一起。俄罗斯争取自由的战斗从1709年的波尔塔瓦战役开始，其中一些最重要的战役是在乌克兰领土上进行的。作为俄罗斯在地中海投射影响力的工具，黑海舰队按照长期租约驻扎在克里米亚的塞瓦斯托波尔。就连索尔仁尼琴和布罗茨基等知名持不同政见者都坚称，乌克兰是俄罗斯历史乃至俄罗斯这个国家不可分割的一部分。
欧盟必须意识到，在围绕乌克兰与欧盟关系展开谈判的过程中，其官僚主义的拖拉做派和把国内政治置于这个战略要素之上的做法使得谈判变成了危机。外交政策是一门确立优先重点的艺术。
乌克兰人是决定因素。他们所在的国家有着错综复杂的历史和语言构成。西部是斯大林和希特勒1939年瓜分战利品时并入苏联的。克里米亚有60%的人口是俄罗斯族人，直到1954年才并入乌克兰，是乌克兰裔的赫鲁晓夫为庆祝俄罗斯与哥萨克达成协议300周年而送给乌克兰的。西部大多信奉天主教；东部大多信奉俄罗斯东正教。西部讲乌克兰语；东部则大多讲俄语。乌克兰的任何一派如果试图支配另一派(以往就是这种模式)，最终就会导致内战或分裂。如果把乌克兰视作东西对抗的一部分，就会毁掉在今后数十年里把俄罗斯与西方(尤其是俄罗斯与欧洲)纳入国际合作体系的希望。
乌克兰只独立了23年，问题的根源在于，乌克兰政界人士试图把他们的意志强加于该国顽固对抗的部分，先是一个派别，后来又是另一个派别。这就是亚努科维奇及其主要政敌季莫申科之间冲突的实质。他们代表了乌克兰的两派，都不愿意分享权力。明智的美国对乌政策应该是设法让该国的两部分彼此合作。我们应该谋求和解，而不是让一个派别占据支配地位。
俄罗斯和西方都没有按照该原则行事，其中尤以乌克兰各派为甚。每一方都使形势雪上加霜。在多条边界不稳的情况下，如果俄罗斯强行采取军事解决办法，就会使自身遭到孤立。对西方来说，把普京妖魔化不是一项政策，而是缺少政策的托词。
普京应该逐渐意识到，无论他有什么样的不满，强行动武的政策都会导致又一场冷战。就美国而言，必须避免把俄罗斯视作需要耐心学习华盛顿确立的行为规则的异类。普京是以俄罗斯历史为前提的重要战略家。理解美国的价值观和心理不是他的强项。理解俄罗斯的历史和心理也不是美国决策者的强项。
寻求达成“平衡的不满意”
各方领导人应该回过头来检视结果，而不是争相摆出各种姿态。以下是我认为符合所有各方价值观和安全利益的结果：
1.乌克兰应该有权自由选择其经济和政治联盟，包括与欧洲的联盟。
2.乌克兰不应加入北约。7年前最后一次提出这个问题的时候，我就持这个立场。
3.乌克兰应该自由组建与民众表达的意愿相一致的政府。明智的乌克兰领导人随后应该在该国不同部分之间实施和解政策。在国际上，他们应该努力采取芬兰那样的姿态。该国明确宣示自身的绝对独立，在大多数领域与西方合作，但又小心避免对俄罗斯采取制度性的敌对态度。
4.俄罗斯吞并克里米亚不符合现有世界秩序的规则。不过，应该有可能把克里米亚与乌克兰的关系置于不太危险的基础之上。要实现这个目标，俄罗斯就得承认乌克兰对克里米亚的主权。乌克兰应该在国际观察员监督下举行的选举中加强克里米亚的自治。这个过程要包括消除关于驻塞瓦斯托波尔黑海舰队地位的所有不明确因素。
这些是原则，而不是处方。熟悉该地区的人士知道，并非以上所有原则都会得到各方认可。考验不在于绝对满意，而在于得到平衡的不满意。如果不能基于以上或类似原则达成某种解决方案，就会加速滑向对抗。那个时刻很快就会到来。
——网友推荐
How the Ukraine crisis ends
Henry A. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977.
Public discussion on Ukraine is all about confrontation. But do we know where we are going? In my life, I have seen four wars begun with great enthusiasm and public support, all of which we did not know how to end and from three of which we withdrew unilaterally. The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins.
Far too often the Ukrainian issue is posed as a showdown: whether Ukraine joins the East or the West. But if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.
Russia must accept that to try to force Ukraine into a satellite status, and thereby move Russia’s borders again, would doom Moscow to repeat its history of self-fulfilling cycles of reciprocal pressures with Europe and the United States.
The West must understand that, to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. Russian history began in what was called Kievan-Rus. The Russian religion spread from there. Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined before then. Some of the most important battles for Russian freedom, starting with the Battle of Poltava in 1709 , were fought on Ukrainian soil. The Black Sea Fleet — Russia’s means of projecting power in the Mediterranean — is based by long-term lease in Sevastopol, in Crimea. Even such famed dissidents as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Joseph Brodsky insisted that Ukraine was an integral part of Russian history and, indeed, of Russia.
The European Union must recognize that its bureaucratic dilatoriness and subordination of the strategic element to domestic politics in negotiating Ukraine’s relationship to Europe contributed to turning a negotiation into a crisis. Foreign policy is the art of establishing priorities.
The Ukrainians are the decisive element. They live in a country with a complex history and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939 , when Stalin and Hitler divided up the spoils. Crimea, 60 percent of whose population is Russian , became part of Ukraine only in 1954 , when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the 300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is largely Catholic; the east largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other — as has been the pattern — would lead eventually to civil war or breakup. To treat Ukraine as part of an East-West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West — especially Russia and Europe — into a cooperative international system.
Ukraine has been independent for only 23 years; it had previously been under some kind of foreign rule since the 14th century. Not surprisingly, its leaders have not learned the art of compromise, even less of historical perspective. The politics of post-independence Ukraine clearly demonstrates that the root of the problem lies in efforts by Ukrainian politicians to impose their will on recalcitrant parts of the country, first by one faction, then by the other. That is the essence of the conflict between Viktor Yanukovych and his principal political rival, Yulia Tymoshenko. They represent the two wings of Ukraine and have not been willing to share power. A wise U.S. policy toward Ukraine would seek a way for the two parts of the country to cooperate with each other. We should seek reconciliation, not the domination of a faction.
Russia and the West, and least of all the various factions in Ukraine, have not acted on this principle. Each has made the situation worse. Russia would not be able to impose a military solution without isolating itself at a time when many of its borders are already precarious. For the West, the demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy; it is an alibi for the absence of one.
Putin should come to realize that, whatever his grievances, a policy of military impositions would produce another Cold War. For its part, the United States needs to avoid treating Russia as an aberrant to be patiently taught rules of conduct established by Washington. Putin is a serious strategist — on the premises of Russian history. Understanding U.S. values and psychology are not his strong suits. Nor has understanding Russian history and psychology been a strong point of U.S. policymakers.
Leaders of all sides should return to examining outcomes, not compete in posturing. Here is my notion of an outcome compatible with the values and security interests of all sides:
1. Ukraine should have the right to choose freely its economic and political associations, including with Europe.
2. Ukraine should not join NATO, a position I took seven years ago, when it last came up.
3. Ukraine should be free to create any government compatible with the expressed will of its people. Wise Ukrainian leaders would then opt for a policy of reconciliation between the various parts of their country. Internationally, they should pursue a posture comparable to that of Finland. That nation leaves no doubt about its fierce independence and cooperates with the West in most fields but carefully avoids institutional hostility toward Russia.
4. It is incompatible with the rules of the existing world order for Russia to annex Crimea. But it should be possible to put Crimea’s relationship to Ukraine on a less fraught basis. To that end, Russia would recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty over Crimea. Ukraine should reinforce Crimea’s autonomy in elections held in the presence of international observers. The process would include removing any ambiguities about the status of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol.
These are principles, not prescriptions. People familiar with the region will know that not all of them will be palatable to all parties. The test is not absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction. If some solution based on these or comparable elements is not achieved, the drift toward confrontation will accelerate. The time for that will come soon enough.
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