2012年11月2日星期五

纽约时报:中国能被描述成“法西斯”吗?

图为胡德平


北京——中国的政治由共产党及其各个强大家族和派系所把持,所以当一名前党总书记的儿子说出,这国家几乎算是个“法西斯”国家时,确实值得一听。
已故的中国共产党总书记胡耀邦因为改革意识太强,于1987年被迫辞去总书记一职。他的儿子胡德平于2005年底,在天安门广场旁的人民大会堂里,对一群中国商人和环保人士说出了上述观点。(因为他父亲的倒台,胡德平被排除在权力核心之外,成为了一名所谓的“没落太子党”,但他的血统依旧让他成为一名红色贵族。)
七年后的今天,政治改革压力不断增加,下周四开始的十八大将在同一座人民大会堂内宣布新一届领导人,而胡德平的话语却依旧萦绕不散。什么是今天的中国,它又将去往何方呢?
根据我的笔记,以下就是胡德平当年所说的话:“不管这个社会是多么的专制,哪怕是法西斯,这个国家的人民仍然需要正义。他们寻求的东西,一个是利益,一个是正义。”
今天的中国是个法西斯国家吗?
这可以举出几个特点来说明,先拿一党制来说吧。从毛泽东死后开始的经济改革,已经使这个国家通过其国有企业的盈利而变得极为富有。中国从一个贫穷的专制国家,变为一个富有的专制国家。而它的国企也跻身世界上最富有企业的行列。
尽管有了一点放松,言论自由和结社自由的权利依然受到严重妨碍。一些高级官员公然蔑视民主。法院则服从党的领导。
官方的口号变本加厉地鼓吹着民族主义和“民族复兴”,这个概念植根于民族主义的神秘情结,流行在上个世纪的法西斯主义思想家之间。
“这些迹象早就存在了,”知名作家和学者王力雄说,“我觉得有一个清晰的走向法西斯主义的趋势,而这种法西斯主义源自那些掌权者们仍在增长的权力。”中国是“一个警察国家”,他说,在这里权力只为权力服务。
毛泽东的去世并没有带来权力的分享,而只不过是脱掉了中国的共产主义意识形态外衣,且并未出现令人信服的价值体系来填补这个空缺,他说。
“掌权者已经变成了一个利益集团。”王力雄说。
“今天的这个利益集团没有意识形态,”他说,“他们的目标是维护自己的财富和权力。他们只能依赖强权来进行统治,因为他们拿不出使人民信服的目标。所以这个国家依赖强权去压迫社会并实现其目的。我想,这些强权拥有者们大概别无选择了。”
的确,我们面对着一些大问题。不过,这里还有一个更加个人化的例子,本周一有五个人来到我们在北京的公寓,检查了我们的护照、签证和居留许可证,其中几个说他们是警察。几乎可以肯定的是,这是在十八大前加强安保措施的一部分。这令我想起了胡德平说过的话。
在他们离开了几秒钟之后,屋子外的走廊里发出了喧嚣的吵闹声。透过观测孔,我看到一名中国邻居正在大声斥责警察多管闲事。这类突击检查令人恐惧并且遭人憎恶,但是人们却越来越敢于直言不讳地说出自己的想法。
当然,除了“法西斯主义”,也有其他的术语被用来形容这里的情况。许纪霖是一位知名的知识分子及上海华东师范大学历史系教授,他写道,“国家主义”在过去几十年中已经占据主导地位。
在一篇去年的短文中,许纪霖警告说,在共产党和政府声称只有自己可以代表“广大人民利益”的氛围下,中国可能会“重新踏上德国和日本在20世纪走过的那条死路”。
而韩国延世大学的约翰・德勒里(John Delury)教授认为,典型的法西斯主义,例如纳粹德国实行的制度,与今天中国发生的情况有较大的不同之处。
“如何定义法西斯主义绝对是关键,”他在来自首尔的电话中说。
“对于使用法西斯主义这个词最有力的反驳之一,是指出法西斯主义的核心元素是大规模动员”,其中包括相关的符号象征和集体动作编排,例如希特勒的纽伦堡集会,德勒里说。毛泽东做过这类事情,但当前的领导层并未这样做,他说,因而表明这个术语并不完全合适。
“我仍然认为当前的领导层,就算不是反毛泽东主义,那也是非常的后毛泽东主义。”德勒里说。
然而对于王力雄来说,即便没有毛泽东的领导魅力,法西斯主义也是一种威胁。他指出,国内民族主义情绪的上升,已经越来越多的针对其他国家。
当他听到这个曾经是禁忌的词汇,这个丢给共产主义之敌的绰号,被中国精英阶层的一员,甚至是一名关键成员,来描绘中国的政治方向时,他感到吃惊吗?
“我听到这个词并不吃惊,因为那些在领导层中的人知道这一点。他们并不觉得这很奇怪,因为他们知道正在发生什么事情。”他说。 
翻译:林蒙克
——纽约时报中文网

LETTER FROM CHINA

Can China Be Described as 'Fascist'?

BEIJING — Chinese politics is controlled by the Communist Party and its powerful families and factions, so when the son of a former party chief says the state is virtually “fascist,” it’s worth listening.
That’s what Hu Deping, son of the late Hu Yaobang, the party general secretary forced to resign in 1987 for being too reform-minded, said to a group of mostly Chinese businesspeople and environmentalists in late 2005, in the Great Hall of the People onTiananmen Square. (Because of his father’s fall, Mr. Hu is outside the mainstream of power, dubbed a “nonprinceling,” but his pedigree still makes him a party aristocrat.)
Seven years later, with pressure for political reform mounting and a new generation of leaders to be announced in that same Great Hall of the People at the 18th Party Congress, which starts next Thursday, Mr. Hu’s words continue to reverberate. What is China today, and where is it headed?
Here’s what Mr. Hu said, according to my notes: “No matter how authoritarian this society is, even fascist, the people of this country still want justice. One thing they seek is profit, and the other is justice.”
Is today’s China fascist?
To cite a few characteristics, starting with the one-party state: Since the economic reforms that followed the death of Mao Zedong, it has grown immensely wealthy through its state-owned companies, some of which rank among the world’s richest. What was once a poor, authoritarian state has become a rich, authoritarian state.
The rights to speak and associate freely remain tightly hobbled despite some relaxation, and some top officials openly scorn democracy. The courts obey the party’s directives.
Official slogans increasingly exhort nationalism and “national rejuvenation,” a concept rooted in a mystical sense of nationhood popular with fascist thinkers in the last century.
“The signs have long been there,” said Wang Lixiong, a prominent writer and scholar. “I feel there is a very clear trend toward fascism, and the source of fascism comes from the ever-growing power of the power holders.” China is “a police state,” he said, where power rules for power’s sake.
The passing of Mao did not lead to power-sharing, it just stripped China of its Communist ideology, and no convincing value system has filled the gap, he said.
“Power has become an interest group,” Mr. Wang said.
“Today the interest groups have no ideology,” he said. “Their goal is to protect their own profit and power. They can only rely on power to rule, because they have no goal that convinces the people. So the state relies on power to suppress society and attain its objectives. I think there’s no other route the power holders can go.”
These are large issues. On a more human scale, I was reminded of Mr. Hu’s words on Monday when five men, several of whom said they were police officers, came to our Beijing apartment to check our passports, visas and residence permits, almost certainly part of the stepped-up security before the Party Congress.
Seconds after they left, a loud argument erupted in the corridor outside. Through the spy hole I watched a Chinese neighbor loudly berate the police for meddling. The checks are intimidating and resented — and people increasingly are not afraid to say so.
For sure, terms other than “fascism” are also used to describe what’s going on. Xu Jilin, a leading intellectual and history professor at East China Normal University, in Shanghai, for example, writes that “statism” has grown dominant in the past decade.
In an essay last year, Mr. Xu warned that in an atmosphere where the Communist Party and the state claim the sole right to represent the “universal interest,” China may “re-tread the broken road of 20th-century Germany and Japan.”
For John Delury, a professor at Yonsei University, in South Korea, there are important differences between classic fascism, such as Nazi Germany’s, and what is happening in China today.
“Absolutely the critical thing is how to define fascism,” he said by telephone from Seoul.
“One of the strongest objections to using the word fascism is that a central element of fascism was mass mobilization,” which included the symbolism and choreography associated with, for example, Hitler’s rallies at Nuremberg, Mr. Delury said. While Mao did that, the current leadership does not, he said, a sign that the term does not exactly fit.
“I think still this leadership is very post-Mao, if not anti-Mao,” said Mr. Delury.
Yet for Mr. Wang, fascism is a threat, even without Mao’s charismatic leadership. He points to rising nationalism at home, increasingly directed overseas.
Does it surprise him to hear what was once a taboo word, an epithet to be hurled at the enemies of Communism, used by a member of China’s elite — even if a critical member — to describe China’s political direction?
“I’m not surprised to hear it, because they know, the people in these ruling circles, they don’t think it’s strange, they know what’s happening,” he said.

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