全文翻译自华尔街日报3月23日文章
原题：China Started the Trade War, Not Trump
作者：Greg Ip
译者：冬天毛
《华尔街日报》（The Wall Street Journal，简写:WSJ）是侧重金融、商业领域报导的日报，创办于1889年，隶属于新闻集团旗下的道琼斯公司。该日报是美国发行量最大的报纸，2013年3月发行量达到240万份（包括电子订阅）。
（维基百科）
正文：
朗读版来自冬天毛
（↑这声音是后期做了升调处理的，非冬天毛本音）
If there's a trade war between the U.S. and China, don't blame Donald Trump: China started it long before he became president.
如果美中两国发生贸易战的话，不要怪罪唐纳德·特朗普：早在他当上总统前很久，中国就已经出手了。
Even free traders and internationalists agree China's predatory trade practices—which include forcing U.S. business to transfer valuable technology to Chinese firms and restricting access to Chinese markets—are undermining both its partners and the trading system.
中国的劫掠式贸易行为给贸易伙伴和贸易系统造成了损害，这是连自由贸易家和国际主义者们都认同的；这些行为中包括强迫美国企业向中国公司转让宝贵的技术，以及限制美国企业在中国的市场准入。
Mr. Trump's China crackdown is risky, but it's on firmer legal, political and economic ground than many of his other trade complaints, for several reasons.
特朗普先生对中国采取的打击行动是有风险的，但与他在贸易方面提出的其他意见相比，其法律、政治和经济依据要坚实得多，原因有以下几个。
1. These products are different: The classic case for free trade predicts that each country specializes where it has a comparative advantage, lowering costs and raising incomes for everyone. If China subsidizes exports of steel to the U.S., in theory the U.S. still benefits because consumers and steel-using industries will have lower costs, and while some steel jobs will disappear, more productive jobs elsewhere will take their place.
第一，这次涉及的产品比较特别。
支持自由贸易的古典理论认为，（在自由贸易条件下）各国能够专门从事自己具有相对优势的生产活动，降低成本，提高所有人的收入。如果中国对向美国出口的钢铁进行补贴，那么理论上美国的消费者和使用钢铁作为原材料的产业还是能享受更低的成本，而虽然钢铁产业会损失一些岗位，但其他行业会有更富生产力的岗位来填补其空缺。
But starting in the 1980s, economists recognized that comparative advantage couldn't explain success in many industries such as commercial jetliners, microprocessors and software. These industries are difficult for competitors to enter because of steep costs for research and development, previously established technical standards, increasing returns to scale (costs drop the more you sell), and network effects (the more customers use the product, the more valuable it becomes).
但是从上世纪80年代开始，经济学家们承认，相对优势理论无法解释很多产业获取的成就，比如商用喷气式客机、微处理器和软件。由于这些产业的研发成本高昂，存在已确立的技术标准，规模收益递增（卖得越多成本越低），而且还存在网络效应（使用产品的顾客越多，产品价值越高），都给竞争者进入市场造成了困难。
In such industries, a handful of firms may reap the lion's share of the wages and profits (what economists call rents), at the expense of others. China's efforts are aimed at achieving such dominance in many of these industries by 2025.
在这类产业中，一小部分公司能够脚踩他人，独占薪资和利润的大头（经济学家管这个叫经济租金）。中国的目的就是要在2025年之前在很多此类产业中获得主导地位。
"China is undermining or taking away some of our rents, so we are relatively worse off and they are better off," says Douglas Irwin, author of "Clashing over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy." Unlike Mr. Trump's tariffs on steel and aluminum, "a lot of economists would hold their fire in terms of attacking Trump for his China actions. I don't think anyone can really defend the way China has moved in the past few years, violating intellectual property and forced technology transfer."
《商业之争：美国外贸政策历史》的作者道格拉斯·欧文表示："中国或是折损，或是取走我们的一部分经济租金，使我们相对过得更糟，而他们则过得更好。"与特朗普先生对钢铁和铝加征关税不同，"对于他在中国方面采取的这些行动，很多经济学家并不打算出声指责。我觉得过去这几年里，中国对知识产权的侵犯和对技术的强制转让确实是没法辩护的行为。"
2. The WTO isn't enough: When China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, many advocates thought it would play by the global rules against advantaging its own firms and hurting others. Instead, China does so anyway in ways not easily remedied by the WTO.
第二，世贸组织爱莫能助。
中国2001年加入WTO时，很多支持者觉得它会遵守国际规则，而不是损人利己，偏袒自家公司。然而，中国还是未如他们所愿，而且采取的做法也是WTO无法矫正的。
Rob Atkinson, president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, notes that a WTO case typically requires evidence from an aggrieved company. But many foreign companies are reluctant to complain about their treatment in China for fear of retaliation, such as being investigated for antitrust, consumer abuse, fraud or espionage, or losing sales to state-controlled companies. With no balance of powers or independent courts, "there is no rule of law to constrain Chinese officials from implementing arbitrary and capricious mercantilist policies," Mr. Atkinson and two co-authors wrote in an extensive critique of China a year ago.
信息技术与创新基金会（冬天毛注：知名科技类智库）的主席罗伯·阿特金森指出，WTO解决争端通常需要受害公司提供证据。然而，很多境外公司并不愿意就它们在中国的遭遇提出申诉，这是因为害怕受到报复，例如受到反垄断、欺凌消费者、欺诈或间谍行为调查，或是失去对国有企业的销售额。一年前的一篇关于中国的长篇评述中，阿特金森先生和两位共同作者写道：由于没有权力制衡和独立的法院，"没有法律规则可以限制中国官员实施任意独断的重商主义政策。"
It is also difficult to hold China accountable for its WTO obligations because its system is so opaque. Mr. Atkinson says many discriminatory measures aren't published, or published only in Chinese. When the central government, under external pressure, rescinds some discriminatory measures, they reappear at the provincial and local level, he says.
由于系统的不透明性，要让中国遵守WTO义务也同样困难。阿特金森先生表示，很多歧视性政策要么不公开，要么就是只有中文版。他说，即使中央政府迫于外部压力而撤销某些歧视性政策，这些措施又会在省级和地方上重新出现。
3. The U.S. isn't alone: Mr. Trump's steel and aluminum tariffs were widely panned for hitting both China and law-abiding allies like Canada and western Europe alike.
第三，美国不是一个人（在战斗）。
特朗普先生对钢铁和铝加征关税之所以受到广泛痛批，是因为这既打击了中国，也伤及了加拿大、西欧等遵纪守法的盟国。
By contrast, his ire at China is widely shared. French President Emmanuel Macron has called for a unified European Union policy against Chinese corporate takeovers.
但和他一样对中国感到恼火的却是大有人在。法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克隆就号召全欧盟统一政策，应对中国的公司并购。
"Everyone who trades with China faces this problem," Peter Navarro, Mr. Trump's trade adviser, told reporters Thursday. "Part of the process that we've undergone … is to have a significant outreach to our like-minded allies and trading partners."
周四，特朗普先生的贸易顾问彼得·纳瓦罗接受记者采访时表示："跟中国有贸易往来的国家都有这个问题。我们行动的一部分……就是尽力与（这方面）想法一致的盟友和贸易伙伴进行接触和沟通。"
4. China isn't like Japan: For decades, Japan, like China now, sought to help Japanese firms by limiting foreign access to its market, providing direct industrial support, and pushing western companies to license their technologies. Japanese companies did catch up in autos, electronics and computers, but the U.S. leapt ahead in new industries such as software and services. Japan's economy entered a long slump in 1992 and hasn't entirely escaped. Some say the current panic about China is similarly misplaced.
第四，中国跟日本不一样。
日本之前有几十年时间跟现在的中国一样，为了帮助本国公司而采取了限制海外公司的市场准入、直接向产业提供支持，以及迫使西方国家的公司提供技术许可这些手段。日本的公司确实在汽车、电子产品和计算机领域赶了上来，但美国也在软件和服务这些新行业跳到了前面。日本的经济在1992年进入了漫长的衰落期，至今没有完全脱离。一些人认为，目前人们对中国的恐慌也来自类似的误区。
But Japan is different. It is a military ally and is thus sensitive to U.S. pressure on trade. China is a geostrategic rival pursuing and sometimes stealing U.S. secrets for both civilian and military purposes.
但日本跟中国并不一样。日本是美国的军事盟国，对于美国在贸易上的施压是很敏感的。中国是一个地缘战略对手，出于民用和军用需要而谋求美国的（技术）机密，有时还会出手盗取。
The scale is also different. Mr. Irwin notes that in 1987, President Ronald Reagan hit $300 million worth of Japanese imports with 100% tariffs for its failure to open its market to U.S. semiconductors. That pales next to the $50 billion worth of damage Trump officials say China's trade practices inflict.
两国的体量也不同。欧文先生指出，罗纳德·里根总统在1987年以日本未向美国开放半导体市场为由，向总值3亿美元的日本进口商品加征了100%的关税。跟特朗普政府官员称中国的贸易行为造成的500亿美元损失相比，日本的影响黯然失色。
"New plays and musicals are often tried first in Philadelphia or Boston before going to Broadway," says Clyde Prestowitz, president of the Economic Strategy Institute. "Well, Japan was Philadelphia. Now, with China, we're on Broadway."
经济战略研究所（冬天毛注：经济类智库）主席克莱德·普雷斯托维茨表示："新出的戏剧和音乐剧通常先在费城或者波士顿试演，然后再上百老汇。日本就是费城。现在中国这边我们就是要上百老汇。"
Japan was reluctant to retaliate because it valued its political and strategic ties with the U.S. China is turning more nationalist and adversarial, making it more willing to retaliate than Japan was.
日本那时不愿还击，是因为它十分看重跟美国的政治和战略联系。而今，中国正变得愈发民族主义，愈发与美国对立，意味着跟昔日的日本相比，中国的反击意愿更强。
This, however, means that the collateral damage of a trade war, and thus the risks of Mr. Trump's strategy, are also much greater. The breadth of his action elevates the potential harm to American consumers, supply chains and exporters.
然而，这也意味着贸易战会殃及更多的无辜，特朗普先生的策略的风险也更大。他的行动影响面之广，也增加了美国的消费者、供给链和出口商可能会蒙受的损失。
Mr. Irwin says it isn't clear that Mr. Trump's strategy is right. Taking China to the WTO might be a less dangerous approach. But he adds: "No one is saying we shouldn't do anything."
欧文先生表示，或许特朗普先生的策略并不正确；在WTO控告中国可能是个危险性更小的方法。但他又补充说："这不是说我们就应该袖手旁观。"
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