2018年6月17日星期日

白宫高官定义特朗普主义——“我们是美国,Bitch”

作者:Jeffrey Goldberg

译者:"学术plus"公众号

美国《大西洋月刊》主编、曾提出"奥巴马主义"的Jeffrey Goldberg上周发表署名文章 "白宫高官定义特朗普主义:'我们是美国,Bitch'",对特朗普政府的外交逻辑进行了探讨。公众号"学术plus"翻译了这篇文章,将文中的Bitch译为"碧池",bitches译为"一群碧池",并说明此举实属无奈(请各抒已见)。现将译稿转载于此,欢迎一起探讨。

Many of Donald Trump's critics find it difficult to ascribe to a president they consider to be both subliterate and historically insensate a foreign-policy doctrine that approaches coherence. A Trump Doctrine would require evidence of Trump Thought, and proof of such thinking, the argument goes, is scant. This view is informed in part by feelings of condescension, but it is not meritless. Barack Obama, whose foreign-policy doctrine I studied in depth, was cerebral to a fault; the man who succeeded him is perhaps the most glandular president in American history. Unlike Obama, Trump possesses no ability to explain anything resembling a foreign-policy philosophy. But this does not mean that he is without ideas.

许多批评唐纳德•特朗普的人都发现,很难描述特朗普既缺乏文化背景、又缺乏历史延续性的外交政策。"特朗普主义"需要思想层面的支持,而批评者认为这种支持不够充分。这种观点在某种程度上是自认为高人一等的心态造成的,但也不是毫无价值。我深入研究过巴拉克•奥巴马的外交政策,对他错误的评价是客观的;接替他的特朗普可能是美国历史上最高傲的总统。特朗普与奥巴马不同,他无力解释任何外交政策哲学。但这并不意味着他没有思想。

Over the past couple of months, I've asked a number of people close to the president to provide me with short descriptions of what might constitute the Trump Doctrine. I've been trying, as part of a larger project, to understand the revolutionary nature of Trump's approach to world affairs. This task became even more interesting over the weekend, when Trump made his most ambitious move yet to dismantle the U.S.-led Western alliance; it becomes more interesting still as Trump launches, without preparation or baseline knowledge, a complicated nuclear negotiation with a fanatical and bizarre regime that quite possibly has his number.

过去的几个月,我咨询了一些与总统关系密切的人,向我提供了关于"特朗普主义"的简短描述。作为更大计划的一个组成,我尝试理解特朗普处理世界事务的方式的革命性。这一任务在上周末变得更加有趣,当时特朗普做出了迄今为止最雄心勃勃的举动,他要拆除美国主导建立的西方联盟;更有趣的是,特朗普在没有任何准备或基础知识的情况下,与一个狂热而怪异的政权展开了一场复杂的核谈判。

Trumpian chaos is, in fact, undergirded by a comprehensible worldview, a number of experts have insisted. The Brookings Institution scholar (and frequent Atlantic contributor) Thomas Wright argued in a January 2016 essay that Trump's views are both discernible and explicable. Wright, who published his analysis at a time when most everyone in the foreign-policy establishment considered Trump's candidacy to be a farce, wrote that Trump loathes the liberal international order and would work against it as president; he wrote that Trump also dislikes America's military alliances, and would work against them; he argued that Trump believes in his bones that the global economy is unfair to the U.S.; and, finally, he wrote that Trump has an innate sympathy for "authoritarian strongmen."

许多专家坚持认为,特朗普式的混乱实际上受一种可理解的世界观支撑。布鲁金斯学会学者托马斯•赖特在2016年1月的一篇文章中指出,特朗普的观点是可观测和可解释的。在当时,外交政策建制派的大多数人都认为特朗普的候选人资格是一场闹剧。赖特认为特朗普不喜欢美国的军事同盟,并会对盟友不利;特朗普坚信经济全球化对美国不公平;他还认为特朗普对"铁腕独裁者"抱有天然的同情心。

Wright was prophetic. Trump's actions these past weeks, and my conversations with administration officials and friends and associates of Trump, suggest that the president will be acting on his beliefs in a more urgent, and focused, way than he did in the first year of his presidency, and that the pace of potentially cataclysmic disruption will quicken in the coming days. And so, understanding Trump's foreign-policy doctrine is more urgent than ever.

赖特的研究是有预见性的。特朗普在过去几周的行动,以及与我对话的政府官员、朋友和特朗普的同事都表明,特朗普将以比他任内第一年更紧迫、更执着的方式,按照自己的信念行事。未来日子里,发生灾难性破坏的速度和可能性都将加大。因此理解特朗普的外交政策理念,比以往任何时候都要显得更为紧迫。

The third-best encapsulation of the Trump Doctrine, as outlined by a senior administration official over lunch a few weeks ago, is this: "No Friends, No Enemies." This official explained that he was not describing a variant of the realpolitik notion that the U.S. has only shifting alliances, not permanent friends. Trump, this official said, doesn't believe that the U.S. should be part of any alliance at all. "We have to explain to him that countries that have worked with us together in the past expect a level of loyalty from us, but he doesn't believe that this should factor into the equation," the official said.  

在我了解到的这些对特朗普主义的描述中,获得铜牌的是"没有朋友,就没有敌人。"一位官员解释说,这不是一种现实政治观点的变体,即美国只会切换盟友,而不会有永久的朋友。他说特朗普不认为美国应该成为任何联盟的一部分:"我们不得不向他解释,过去与我们合作过的国家希望我们能保持一定程度的忠诚,但他认为这不应纳入考量。"

The second-best self-description of the Trump Doctrine I heard was this, from a senior national-security official: "Permanent destabilization creates American advantage." The official who described this to me said Trump believes that keeping allies and adversaries alike perpetually off-balance necessarily benefits the United States, which is still the most powerful country on Earth. When I noted that America's adversaries seem far less destabilized by Trump than do America's allies, this official argued for strategic patience. "They'll see over time that it doesn't pay to argue with us."

对于特朗普主义,次优的表达是:"永久失稳成就美国优势。"一位官员对我说,特朗普认为美国是世界上最强大的国家,应让盟友和对手永远处于失稳状态,这样必然有利于美国。当我指出美国的对手似乎比美国的盟友更不稳定时,这位官员强调要有战略耐心。"随着时间的推移,他们会发现无法负担与我们争执的代价。"

The best distillation of the Trump Doctrine I heard, though, came from a senior White House official with direct access to the president and his thinking. I was talking to this person several weeks ago, and I said, by way of introduction, that I thought it might perhaps be too early to discern a definitive Trump Doctrine.

"No," the official said. "There's definitely a Trump Doctrine."

What is it?, I asked. Here is the answer I received:

"The Trump Doctrine is 'We're America, Bitch.' That's the Trump Doctrine."

不过,我听到的对特朗普主义的最佳表达,来自一位直接了解总统及其思想的白宫高级官员。几个星期前我和这个人交谈,我当时说现在就定义"特朗普主义"可能为时过早。

"不,"这位官员说。"特朗普主义肯定存在。"

"它是什么?"我问到。然后我得到了这个答案:

"特朗普主义是'我们是美国,碧池'"这就是特朗普主义。

It struck me almost immediately that this was the most acute, and attitudinally honest, description of the manner in which members of Trump's team, and Trump himself, understand their role in the world.

我立刻意识到,这是理解特朗普及其团队在世界舞台上角色定位最敏锐、最诚实的描述。

I asked this official to explain the idea. "Obama apologized to everyone for everything. He felt bad about everything." President Trump, this official said, "doesn't feel like he has to apologize for anything America does." I later asked another senior official, one who rendered the doctrine not as "We're America, Bitch" but as "We're America, Bitches," whether he was aware of the 2004 movie Team America: World Police, whose theme song was "America, Fuck Yeah!"

我请这位官员解释这个想法。这位官员说:"奥巴马向所有人道歉,他对一切都感到抱歉。特朗普总统不觉得他需要为美国做的任何事道歉。"后来我又问了另一位高级官员,他把这个信条说成不是"我们是美国,碧池",而是"我们是美国,一群碧池!"。不知他是否记得2004年的电影《美国战队:世界警察》的主题曲《美国,去你妈的!》

"Of course," he said, laughing. "The president believes that we're America, and people can take it or leave it."

"当然,"他笑着说。"总统相信我们是美国,人们要么接受要么离开。"

"We're America, Bitch" is not only a characterologically accurate collective self-appraisal—the gangster fronting, the casual misogyny, the insupportable confidence—but it is also perfectly Rorschachian. To Trump's followers, "We're America, Bitch" could be understood as a middle finger directed at a cold and unfair world, one that no longer respects American power and privilege. To much of the world, however, and certainly to most practitioners of foreign and national-security policy, "We're America, Bitch" would be understood as self-isolating, and self-sabotaging.

"我们是美国,碧池"在心理学上不仅是典型群体的自我评价(流氓头子、厌女症),而且也是一类完美的罗夏人格测试。对于特朗普的追随者来说,"我们是美国,碧池"可以被理解为对冷酷而不公平、不尊重美国的力量和特权的世界竖起中指,而对世界上大部分国家来说,"我们是美国,碧池"会被理解为自我孤立,自我崩坏。

I'm not arguing that the attitude underlying "We're America, Bitch" is without any utility. There are occasions—the 1979 Iran hostage crisis comes to mind—in which a blunt posture would have been useful, or at least ephemerally satisfying. President Obama himself expressed displeasure—in a rhetorically controlled way—at the failure of American allies to pay what he viewed as their fair share of common defense costs. And I don't want to suggest that there is no place for self-confidence in foreign-policy making. The Iran nuclear deal was imperfect in part because the Obama administration seemed, at times, to let Iran drive the process. One day the Trump administration may have a lasting foreign-policy victory of some sort. It is likely that the North Korea summit will end, if not disastrously, then inconclusively. But there is a slight chance that it could mark the start of a useful round of negotiations. And I'm not one to mock Jared Kushner for his role in the Middle East peace process. There is virtually no chance of the process succeeding, but the great experts have all tried and failed, so why shouldn't the president's son-in-law give it a shot?

我并不是说"我们是美国,碧池"的态度是没有任何效用的。1979年的伊朗人质危机,强硬姿态是有用的,或者至少在短期内是令人满意的。奥巴马总统自己表达了自己的沮丧,对美国盟友未能支付他所认为的他们在共同国防开支中所占的公平份额表示不满。我不想说其外交政策制定中毫无自信。伊朗核协议并不完美,部分原因是奥巴马政府有时似乎让伊朗来主导这一进程,有一天特朗普政府可能会获得某种形式的外交胜利,朝鲜峰会很有可能结束,即使不是灾难性的也将是不稳定,这可能标志着一轮有益的谈判的开始。我不是嘲笑贾里德·库什纳在中东和平进程中扮演的角色,这一进程几乎不可能成功,但伟大的专家们都尝试过且失败了,所以为什么不让总统的女婿试一试呢?

But what is mainly interesting about "We're America, Bitch" is its delusional quality. Donald Trump is pursuing policies that undermine the Western alliance, empower Russia and China, and demoralize freedom-seeking people around the world. The United States could be made weaker—perhaps permanently—by the implementation of the Trump Doctrine.

"我们是美国,碧池"的有趣之处在于其臆想性质。唐纳德•特朗普推行的政策破坏了西方联盟,赋予了俄罗斯和中国力量和权力,打击了世界各地寻求自由的人们的士气,美国可能会因为特朗普主义的实施而衰弱,这或许是永久性。

The administration officials, and friends of Trump, I've spoken with in recent days believe the opposite: that Trump is rebuilding American power after an eight-year period of willful dissipation. "People criticize [Trump] for being opposed to everything Obama did, but we're justified in canceling out his policies," one friend of Trump's told me. This friend described the Trump Doctrine in the simplest way possible. "There's the Obama Doctrine, and the 'Fuck Obama' Doctrine," he said. "We're the 'Fuck Obama' Doctrine."

最近几天,我与特朗普的政府官员和朋友们谈过,他们的观点截然相反:在美国经历了8年的肆意挥霍之后,特朗普正在重振美国力量。"人们批评(特朗普)反对奥巴马的一切,但我们有理由取消他的政策,"特朗普的一位朋友告诉我。这位朋友用最直白的方式描述了特朗普主义。

"有奥巴马主义,也有'去他妈的奥巴马'主义,"他说,

"我们是'去他妈的奥巴马'主义。"


https://finance.sina.cn/usstock/mggd/2018-06-17/detail-iheauxvy5795773.d.html?from=groupmessage


西雅图雷尼尔:美国农业怕中国增加关税吗?

前言

最近中国商务部列出了对美国制裁的清单,其中大量包括农产品。有些人嘲笑美国是个农业国。其实,这从一个方面反映了国内对美国的误解,尤其是对美国农业的误解。此农业国非彼农业国。所以本文简单介绍一下,美国的农业究竟是怎么一回事。

部分加税清单

美国的农业笑傲地球

过去的两个多世纪里,美国基础产业中农业的领导地位是最最稳固的。自十九世纪中开始,美国的农业为全球五分之一的人口的吃、穿提供了充足的食物和纤维。而这个为全世界五分之一人口提供粮食和纤维的行业,产值仅占美国经济1.2%,美国从事农业生产的人不到1%

美国主要出口的农产品 肉制品,玉米制品是大头

美国农产品主要出口国家

美国的农业不是普通意义上的农业,是工业化的农业 agriculture industry, 跟东亚的小农经济完全不是一个概念。

美国的农业革命

解放生产力:

从1860到1910年的半个世纪内,美国经历了一次农业革命。在内战结束后,胜利的北方的工业与银行为主的工商业经济对南方的农业经济进行了或明或暗的掠夺。所以从1867到1897年近30年间,美国农业地区处于一种连续不断的反抗状态。当时美国人口是31,443,321, 农业人口为15,141,000, 几乎一半人口都从事农业。解决问题的一个办法就是,提高农业生产率,从土地上解放更多的劳动力出来。所以在那个时间段,美国农业革命进入快车道。



技术进步:

从技术进步的历史来看,1850年代起,美国农业主要在三方面取的了重大进步:

  • 农业机械的进步;

  • 种子改良;

  • 化肥的广泛应用。

这三方面,美国直到今天依然处于世界上最先进水平。


美国的联合收割机,收一英亩麦子只需二十二分钟,英国同类机器要多花两倍时间。当时美国一台打谷机能替代一百二十个熟练农民的工作。美国的农业机械化程度超前世界上所有国家半个世纪以上。1860年后的半个世纪,美国完成了农业机械化。


美国的农业革命,开始于农业机械的普及。19世纪50年代,联合收割机获得专利,使得生产效率提高一倍。


最早的联合收割机是靠马拉的

1868年,蒸汽拖拉机开始使用在农业中。 


种蒸汽机械,广泛应用到各种农业机械上去,比如播种,犁地,卷扬机等等。

1910年之后,农业机械开始广泛使用汽油引擎,使得农机在美国农业中进一步得到普及。农业机械化的后果是生产率增加。


美国农业的生产效率在1840到1910年之间,一直高居于世界第一,并与第二位的英国拉开了很大的距离。这一时期,美国农业生产效率提高了44.2%,英国只提高了百分之28.6%。这一时期,美国小麦生产效率提高了133.3%,玉米生产效率提高了87.8%,棉花生产效率提高了百分之56.8%。同一时期,包括工业在内的整体美国经济的生产率(每小时劳动的产量)只增长了大约百分之20%。


1910年,美国的总人口是91,972,266, 农业人口 32,077,000 已经从50%降到了30%

这是美国从1840年开始到2010年农民人口占总人口的比例。从近70%降到现在的1%左右。


制度创新:

美国的制度创新,是美国农业发展的另一个前提条件。

政策上1862年林肯政府颁布了《宅地法》与《莫里尔法案》大大促进了农业革命的发展。(不需要年年发1号文件,立法就是最大的重视)。

莫里尔法案》(Morrill Act)对美国影响非常深远。该法案规定,联邦政府按每州国会议员人数每人拨出三万英亩土地,并将这些赠地所得的收益在每州至少资助一所农工学院称"赠地学院"。学院主要课程,必须按照各州政府法律规定讲授与农业和机械工艺有关的知识,为促进工农业的各个阶层培养专门人才。联邦政府共拨地一千七百四十三万英亩用以赠地学院。二十八个州设置了专门的农工学院,其余的州将土地拨给州立大学在州立大学内添设农工学院。《莫里尔法案》对美国高等教育影响极大,后来其中最有名的大学应该属于德州农工大学


名字很土气,但是绝对是个很不错的大学,世界排名100以内,美国前五十很稳工科前十。


市场经济:

美国农业从1840年起,就建立起了大规模的农场式生产方式。市场经济的农场体制将提高生产效率转化为外在的自由竞争,使美国农业取得了巨大的技术进步。充分的市场竞争使得农场优胜劣汰,集约度越来越高。

美国农场数,土地数,平均单个农村的面积

美国农业革命的结果就是,家庭农场逐渐发展成了大型农场、土地轮作制、专业分工协作、区域专业化。硬生生把农业搞成了工业,使美国的农业进入了工业化时代。


今年美国农业的现状已经跟1910年又有了巨大的变化,现在很多产品完全是工厂化生产出来的。比如美国1/3的苹果是我们附近一个城市生产的。美国1/3的橙子和西红柿是加州沙漠中人工造出来的绿洲生产出来的。感兴趣的可以看看America Revaled系列纪录片的第一集 《美国的农业》

透视美国

中国对美国农产品加税的影响

有影响。但是对美国的影响没有那么大,对中国自身的影响会比较大。


前面说过美国的农业人口占美国的人口1%,产值也就占美国的GDP1%,所以指望搞美国农产品会撬动美国政策转向是不太可能的。


另外,美国的农业非常强大,是订单式生产的农业。很多土地都是根据市场需求来决定种什么不种什么。比如种大豆还是种玉米完全是根据市场需求来定的。

美国有段时间玉米生产很多,政府还有清洁能源的补贴,美国用玉米制作了大量的玉米乙醇燃料来替代汽油。大量玉米不是被吃掉的,而是烧掉的。所以退一万步来讲,美国的农民大不了回来继续种玉米,政府稍微补贴一下就够了。


而对中国来讲,温的时代还经常念叨守住18亿亩耕地的红线。这几年的房地产开发,红线应该早就越过了。耕地就那么多,种了小麦,稻子就不能种大豆,种了大豆就不能种小麦和稻子。东北突击种大豆这种想法完全是不切实际的。


中国大量进口大豆的目的不仅仅是为了榨油,还为了豆粕。豆粕是养殖业的重要原料,间接决定了肉类产品价格。肉类价格的涨价会直接推动CPI,推动通胀。



大豆价格涨30%,直接拉动CPI 0.5个点。。

增加农产品关税是杀敌100,自损1000的操作

小结

限于篇幅,我们仅仅简单介绍了一下美国第一次农业革命的历史与成果。

美国在1960年代之后,农业开展了第二次革命,美国的农业技术水平和生产力有了更进一步的提升。直到现在美国的农业创新依然很发达,生产率方面独步全球。

而中国的总体农业水平还没有达到美国上一次农业革命的水平。2017年农业人口的比例还在42%左右,跟1860年的美国相当。


而跟1860年代的美国联邦政府相比,今天中国的很多政策非常令人费解:

一方面农民工在慢慢消失,各地频现用工荒。

另外一方面,各级城市都在努力清理低瑞人口,抑制城镇化进程。

更不要说投入巨资去兴办专门的农工学院了,去教育,培训,扶持农民了。

不知道拿锄头有什么值得宣传的,别人150多年前,就机械化了


无论是技术的推广,技术应用,还是在制度方面,中国追赶美国农业还有很长很长的路要走。

.


—— 西雅图雷尼尔

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