英国《经济学人》：习近平“中国梦”的隐忧

英国《经济学人》最新文章关注中国领导人习近平和他上任后提出的“中国梦”。

文章从清乾隆皇帝说起，英国特使马戛尔尼1793年到中国晋见乾隆提出建交签约通商等要求但遭到回绝，1830年英国人再次回到中国，但这次用大炮打开了中国通商口岸，而中国此后几次试图改革都宣告失败，清帝国崩溃，最终由共产党主管政权。

文章说，中国由盛而衰，如今又朝向全盛时期迈进。

乾隆年间中国国内生产总值约占全球的三分之一，如今中国的经济估计在10年之内将超越美国，中国的全球影响力正在逐渐扩大，即将重新站到原本的位置。

作为中国的领导人，习近平上任后提出“中国梦”的概念，“中国梦”这三个字一夜之间“爆红”，电视、报纸、网络、微博，大家都在谈论中国梦。

意识形态的模糊

文章问，习近平的中国梦到底是什么？似乎和美国梦有一点相似，但又隐含了中国的民族主义色彩和重新包装过后的独裁主义。

文章说，在习近平之前，中共几代领导人各有其主张，毛泽东坚持社会主义路线，但自邓小平之后，中国领导人的意识形态比较模糊，但党仍然是控制一切的。

经过“三个代表”和“和谐社会”之后，新一代的领导人上任后高调反腐反贪，提出中国梦要将中国带回到全盛时期。

文章认为，习近平实现中国梦的首要目标，毫无疑问的是维持经济的成长，但有两点隐忧。

中国梦的“隐忧”

文章说，第一个隐忧是民族主义的抬头，中国人仍然没有忘记自己曾经是民族主义的受害者，激情的爱国主义分子对过去的侵略者仍然心怀仇恨。

习近平上任后视察一些军事单位，也发表一些中国军力的讲话，即使展示与遏阻警告的用意大于实际动作，但仍然引起周边国家的担忧。

文章认为，如果中国强大后只是自管自的那就不足为惧，但是一旦中国从殖民受害者变成霸权，要和日本算算旧账，那就会给整个地区和中国自己都带来危险。

文章说，中国梦的第二个隐忧就是造成一党独大，党的利益大过人民的利益。

党大于人民

习近平曾说，实现人民快乐的生活是政府的任务，中国人和美国人一样，也想要拥有一个房子，送孩子上大学，但是习近平似乎更强调党的权力。

习近平要求军队忠于党，他公开表示苏联的垮台就是一个教训，他告诉党员说，“中国梦是一个理想，共产党员必须有更高的理想，那就是共产主义。”

文章认为，习近平实现中国梦的挑战就是他是否能实现法治，惟有宪法权力高于党的时候，反腐反贪才能成功。

文章最后提到《南方周末》新年献词由提倡宪政改革的《中国梦，宪政梦》被改动所引起的风波说，如果南周事件有任何的代表性的话，那么习近平离中国梦还很遥远。（BBC)

Xi Jinping and the Chinese dream

The vision of China’s new president should serve his people, not a nationalist state

May 4th 2013 |From the print edition

IN 1793 a British envoy, Lord Macartney, arrived at the court of the Chinese emperor, hoping to open an embassy. He brought with him a selection of gifts from his newly industrialising nation. The Qianlong emperor, whose country then accounted for about a third of global GDP, swatted him away: “Your sincere humility and obedience can clearly be seen,” he wrote to King George III, but we do not have “the slightest need for your country’s manufactures”. The British returned in the 1830s with gunboats to force trade open, and China’s attempts at reform ended in collapse, humiliation and, eventually, Maoism.

China has made an extraordinary journey along the road back to greatness. Hundreds of millions have lifted themselves out of poverty, hundreds of millions more have joined the new middle class. It is on the verge of reclaiming what it sees as its rightful position in the world. China’s global influence is expanding and within a decade its economy is expected to overtake America’s. In his first weeks in power, the new head of the ruling Communist Party, Xi Jinping, has evoked that rise with a new slogan which he is using, as belief in Marxism dies, to unite an increasingly diverse nation. He calls his new doctrine the “Chinese dream” evoking its American equivalent. Such slogans matter enormously in China (see article). News bulletins are full of his dream. Schools organise speaking competitions about it. A talent show on television is looking for “The Voice of the Chinese Dream”.

Countries, like people, should dream. But what exactly is Mr Xi’s vision? It seems to include some American-style aspiration, which is welcome, but also a troubling whiff of nationalism and of repackaged authoritarianism.

The end of ideology

Since the humiliations of the 19th century, China’s goals have been wealth and strength. Mao Zedong tried to attain them through Marxism. For Deng Xiaoping and his successors, ideology was more flexible (though party control was absolute). Jiang Zemin’s theory of the “Three Represents” said the party must embody the changed society, allowing private businessmen to join the party. Hu Jintao pushed the “scientific-development outlook” and “harmonious development” to deal with the disharmony created by the yawning wealth gap.

Now, though, comes a new leader with a new style and a popular photogenic wife. Mr Xi talks of reform; he has launched a campaign against official extravagance. Even short of detail, his dream is different from anything that has come before. Compared with his predecessors’ stodgy ideologies, it unashamedly appeals to the emotions. Under Mao, the party assaulted anything old and erased the imperial past, now Mr Xi’s emphasis on national greatness has made party leaders heirs to the dynasts of the 18th century, when Qing emperors demanded that Western envoys kowtow (Macartney refused).

But there is also plainly practical politics at work. With growth slowing, Mr Xi’s patriotic doctrine looks as if it is designed chiefly to serve as a new source of legitimacy for the Communist Party. It is no coincidence that Mr Xi’s first mention of his dream of “the great revival of the Chinese nation” came in November in a speech at the national museum in Tiananmen Square, where an exhibition called “Road to Revival” lays out China’s suffering at the hands of colonial powers and its rescue by the Communist Party.

Dream a little dream of Xi

Nobody doubts that Mr Xi’s priority will be to keep the economy growing—the country’s leaders talk about it taking decades for their poor nation to catch up with the much richer Americans—and that means opening up China even more. But his dream has two clear dangers.

One is of nationalism. A long-standing sense of historical victimhood means that the rhetoric of a resurgent nation could all too easily turn nasty. As skirmishes and provocations increase in the neighbouring seas (see Banyan), patriotic microbloggers need no encouragement to demand that the Japanese are taught a humiliating lesson. Mr Xi is already playing to the armed forces. In December, on an inspection tour of the navy in southern China, he spoke of a “strong-army dream”. The armed forces are delighted by such talk. Even if Mr Xi’s main aim in pandering to hawks is just to keep them on side, the fear is that it presages a more belligerent stance in East Asia. Nobody should mind a confident China at ease with itself, but a country transformed from a colonial victim to a bully itching to settle scores with Japan would bring great harm to the region—including to China itself.

The other risk is that the Chinese dream ends up handing more power to the party than to the people. In November Mr Xi echoed the American dream, declaring that “To meet [our people’s] desire for a happy life is our mission.” Ordinary Chinese citizens are no less ambitious than Americans to own a home (see article), send a child to university or just have fun (see article). But Mr Xi’s main focus seems to be on strengthening the party’s absolute claim on power. The “spirit of a strong army”, he told the navy, lay in resolutely obeying the party’s orders. Even if the Chinese dream avoids Communist rhetoric, Mr Xi has made it clear that he believes the Soviet Union collapsed because the Communist Party there strayed from ideological orthodoxy and rigid discipline. “The Chinese dream”, he has said, “is an ideal. Communists should have a higher ideal, and that is Communism.”

A fundamental test of Mr Xi’s vision will be his attitude to the rule of law. The good side of the dream needs it: the economy, the happiness of his people and China’s real strength depend on arbitrary power being curtailed. But corruption and official excess will be curbed only when the constitution becomes more powerful than the party. This message was spelled out in an editorial in a reformist newspaper on January 1st, entitled “The Dream of Constitutionalism”. The editorial called for China to use the rule of law to become a “free and strong country”. But the censors changed the article at the last minute and struck out its title. If that is the true expression of Mr Xi’s dream, then China still has a long journey ahead.