刘罡：薄熙来的另外“两宗罪”

7月25日，中国检方以"受贿、贪污和滥用职权"这三宗罪对薄熙来提出起诉，但有美国学者认为，颠覆官员选拔程序以及大搞民粹主义是造成薄熙来倒台的另两大原因。

美国《大西洋月刊》网站7月25日刊登了该刊记者对美国宾夕法尼亚大学法学教授Jacques DeLisle的专访，后者认为，促使薄熙来倒台的真正原因是他投身到了一场高风险的游戏中。他为了在党内获得更高的职位，使用了非正常渠道，着力培植自己的民粹主义权力基础，而这恰恰犯了中国政治的大忌。中国有着相当秘密和严格的领导层继任人选拔程序，但薄熙来试图颠覆这一程序，他希望借助自己的个人号召力和赢得草根支持者的能力来另辟蹊径跻身最高领导层，这是他犯下的大错。

Jacques DeLisle认为，薄熙来还在重庆搞了独树一帜的治理模式，这一模式与在中国政坛占主流地位的改革派倡导的政治模式存在冲突。他主政重庆时的执政理念是，要让国家在经济中扮演重要角色，避免进行任何重大的市场化改革；与中国主流派政治精英相比，薄熙来对"法治"更加持轻蔑的态度。薄熙来的民粹主义政治态度使他与中国改革派人士的关系处于紧张状态。

美国彭博新闻社7月25日的报道说，中国领导人决定现在起诉薄熙来，这表明他们已经可以自信地认为，把薄熙来送上法庭不会导致社会不稳。薄熙来在重庆实施的民粹主义政策曾为他赢得了众多支持者，这一政策将降低贫困作为主要目标之一，并着力恢复共产党执政初期中国社会所风行的"红歌"和革命口号。

报道说，薄熙来主政重庆时大力增加社会事业支出，并由国家牵头为各种建设项目提供资金，这些举措使他在中国一时间成为风云人物。薄熙来在重庆的"打黑"行动成为了他在当地的执政基石。薄熙来在全国各地都吸引了许多崇拜者，这种现象在中国的政治人物中是不多见的。

（本文作者刘罡是《华尔街日报》中文网编辑兼专栏撰稿人。文中所述仅代表他的个人观点。）

――华尔街日报，读者推荐

【附】

Bo Xilai Has Been Indicted. Now What?

MATT SCHIAVENZA

Former Chongqing Party Chief Bo Xilai, photographed here in 2010, likely faces a lengthy prison sentence after being indicted today. (Jason Lee/Reuters)

JUL 25 2013, 5:58 PM ET

The disgraced politician now faces trial for bribery, corruption, and abuse of power. What his downfall tells us about the current state of Chinese politics.

The penny has dropped for Bo Xilai. The one-time Chongqing Party Secretary, held in limbo since March 2012, was indicted today for bribery, corruption, and abuse of power stemming from his previous stint as the top official in Dalian. Bo's long-awaited trial will mark the culmination of China's most serious political scandal in a generation, one that began with the poisoning death of British businessman Neil Heywood in Chongqing in November 2011.

To tease out some of the implications of the Bo Xilai issue, I spoke to Jacques DeLisle, a law professor and Director at the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Pennsylvania. The following is a transcript of our remarks, edited for length and clarity.

Now that Bo Xilai has been indicted, when will his trial be held? 

There's been a lot of speculation about that already, and of course nobody knows for sure. But I suspect the trial won't be too far into the future because the government has sat on this issue for so long. It's hard to imagine what the motivation would be for indicting him and then letting the indictment sit for a long time. 

Another reason that the trial will likely happen sooner rather than later is the arrival of two major events on the Chinese political calendar. The first is the traditional summer retreat of the Communist Party elite to Beidaihe, a beach resort near Beijing, where the country's top leaders go to set the agenda for the coming year. The second is the coming third plenum of the National People's Congress early this fall, an event where policies will be set. This time, the third plenum will be particularly important because it comes after the installation of a new president [Xi Jinping], something that happens in China only once every 10 years.

So is there any chance that Bo will be acquitted?

(Laughs) You'd have to get really, really big odds to cover that bet. If he were acquitted it'd be shocking -- totally out of the ordinary. But what's interesting to me is what they're charging him with.

Why is that?

Well, the main focus of the Bo Xilai controversy was what he did in his last post as the Party Secretary of Chongqing, including the unpardonable sin of campaigning publicly for a spot in the Standing Committee of the Politburo [China's highes decision-making body]. China has a fairly secretive and managed successor process, but Bo tried to subvert this by invoking his own personal standing and his ability to cultivate grass-roots support. That was a huge infraction on his part.

If you look more broadly at what the public saw in Bo, you see someone who ran a brutal dictatorship in Chongqing. There was some genuine support for his anti-crime crackdown, of course, but its brutality, and disregard of legal restrictions and procedures, were  problematic. Bo tried to shake down local business interests in the city, and angered China's "rule of law" types by going after a defense lawyer named Li Zhuang, who was defending someone caught up in one of Bo's "anti-mafia" cases.

But the indictment, insofar as we know, just has to do with the crimes of embezzlement and abuse of power that focused on his earlier tenure as the Party Secretary of Dalian, in northeastern China, and has nothing to do with what he did in Chongqing.

Why would Beijing handle it this way? Why not go after him for his Chongqing crimes, and, if his Dalian crimes merited arrest, why didn't they arrest him years ago?

Almost every official at Bo's level in China has skeletons in the closet, so if they had gone after him when he was running Dalian -- his crimes there were not uncommon for Chinese leaders -- then you'd give the impression that members of the elite would be vulnerable to criminal prosecution. 

So had the Wang Lijun incident [the Police Chief who fled to the U.S. Embassy in February 2012] not occurred in Chongqing, would Bo have even run into trouble?

The Wang Lijun case made it easy to go after Bo; there's something terribly embarrassing when your top aide tries to defect to the United States and then hands over a bunch of information in the process. And there were other revelations that hurt him, such as tapping the phones of [former President] Hu Jintao when he was visiting Chongqing. 

But in general, Bo was playing a high-stakes, high-risk game. He was going outside the usual channels in a bid for higher office by cultivating a populist power base, and that's just a big no-no in Chinese politics. He also stood for a particular model of governance that was at odds with the broadly reformist bloc that runs the country. Bo's vision of Chongqing was in having the state play a big role and to avoid any big market reforms, and he was a good deal more contemptuous and dismissive of "rule of law" values than even the mainstream elite -- which is saying something. His populist, almost neo-Maoist approach was in tension with the reformist, market-oriented model favored by the likes of [former Guangdong Party Chief and current Vice Premier] Wang Yang. 

Bo Xilai attracted genuine grassroots support as Chongqing's boss. Will they come out to rally during his trial?

A few years ago this would have been totally unthinkable in China, but with the rise in protests recently people do seem to feel more free to take to the streets. That said, most of the protesters seem more concerned with local economic or environmental issues than anything broadly political.

So will we see a lot of people out in the streets for Bo Xilai? I doubt it. It'd be a risky thing to do, I think, going out and expressing support for someone accused of doing some pretty terrible things. But what's interesting in this: the trial is being held not in Chongqing or Dalian but in Jinan, capital of Shandong Province, which is an area with which Bo has no ties. This might suggest some concern to avoid some embarrassing, if not actually threatening, protests. 

What will Bo's sentence be?

I'd guess it'll be somewhere been many years and a suspended death sentence, the latter of which in China usually means life in prison. The odds of him being executed is practically nil -- it just doesn't happen to top leaders in China, not to [Mao Zedong's last wife and Gang of Four member] Jiang Qing, nor people nearer to Bo like his wife Gu Kailai, who was convicted in the murder of Neil Heywood. Chen Liangyu, the Shanghai Party Chief convicted for corruption in 2008, is probably the closest comparison, and he didn't even get a suspended death sentence.

What lesson does Bo's case teach existing Chinese officials?

I don't think it teaches them anything they don't already know. That is to say -- if you engage in corrupt or abusive behavior in these high positions (Party secretary, provincial governor, etc.) you might end up with your political enemies wanting to take your down. Lots of people of course get away with a lot of stuff -- but even for people like Bo in the upper tier of elite, there is that risk of getting caught
.