原文：Everything You Think You Know About China Is Wrong
作者：裴敏欣
发表：2012年8月29日
本文由"译者"志愿者翻译并校对，参考了其他同来源编译版本
【原文配图】
过去40年，美国对其对手的衰败一直后知后觉。20世纪70年代，美国认为苏联还是一个巨人，尽管那时的苏联已被腐败和低效腐蚀殆尽。20世纪80年代，美国又在担心日本会在经济上超过美国，然而，由于执着于投机与政治腐败，日本经济终于在1991年崩溃。
美国在对中国的预测上会重蹈覆辙吗？最新的消息显示，中国已经显露出颓势：持续减速的经济增速、堆积如山的滞销产品、不断增加的贷款坏账和即将爆发的房地产泡沫，还有无穷无尽的政治丑闻。而诸多推动中国发展的因素，比如人口红利、环境、廉价劳动力以及几乎无限的外部市场，都在慢慢消失。
然而，美国上到精英阶层下到普通民众都不认为中国会衰退。美国总统奥巴马去年11月便开始大肆宣传的"重返亚洲"，其前提便是中国的崛起；五角大楼称到2020年左右，要将60%的海军军力部署在亚太地区；美国还在考虑在东亚地区部署海上反导弹系统，这同样也源于对中国导弹力量的担忧。
为了即将到来的美国总统大选，民主党和共和党的候选人都将中国力量看作影响其国家安全和政治权力的重要因素。民主党以中国经济增长为由呼吁政府对教育和绿色科技领域的投入。八月底，"美国进步中心"和"下一代中心"（译注：二者都是美国的左翼智库）发布了一份报告，预测说到2030年中国将有2亿大学毕业生。报告认为美国的前景黯淡，并要求立刻下决心行动。共和党则将其不断增加的军费开支归结于抵御中国军力的增长。8月底召开的"共和党全国代表大会"上，2012年共和党论坛的说法是："面对中国不断增长的军事实力，美国及我们的盟友必须保持适度的军事力量来削弱中国对其邻国的任何激进的或胁迫性的行动。"
尽管美国媒体一再披露中国内部的脆弱性，美国人仍然相信中国的强大是不可撼动的。对这一断层的解释之一就是美国精英和普通民众对中国了解不足，和对于其未来数十年内将面临的经济挑战的实质认识不清。北京目前遭遇的经济放缓既不是周期性的，也不是因为外部对中国商品的需求疲弱所致，中国的经济问题比这些更加积重难返：超强的国有经济浪费了资本，同时挤压了私有领域、系统性的效率不足和缺乏创新、贪得无厌的统治精英一门心思地要为自己谋利并享有无上特权、金融领域发育迟缓、还有病入膏肓的环境问题和人口压力。然而，尽管中国存在种种问题并陷入困境，但人们依然认为，中国的基本面强劲有力。
美国国内的情况也影响了他们对于中国的判断。这并非是一种巧合，20世纪70年代和80年代美国预料其对手不会衰败时，美国国内的不满正在加剧。（如吉米・卡特的"萎靡演说"。译注：卡特曾在美国民众不满加剧的时候将问题归结为信心危机，号召大家在困难时调低暖气，多穿一件毛衣，被大众解读为推卸自己的责任。）而现在，中国的经济增长率从年均10%跌至（目前的）8%，那也远远好过于美国低于2%的年均经济增速和持续高于8%的失业率。在许多美国人眼里，尽管中国情况不佳，美国却更糟糕。
中国将日益强大和主动的看法能如此深入人心也是因为北京自己的所作所为。执政党中国共产党继续利用民族主义情绪来提升其合法性，同时捍卫中国的民族荣誉。中国的国有媒体和历史教科书以扭曲的强硬的说法、彻底的谎言和民族主义迷思来教导更年轻的一代，这些都很容易激发起反西方或反日的情绪，北京不愿在领土纠纷中与美国的主要亚洲盟友，如日本和菲律宾，进行妥协，这更令人担心。在有争议的海域，尤其是南中国海有可能发生对峙，导致真正的武装冲突，这让许多美国人认为他们不能卸下对中国的防卫。
不幸的是，这样的错误估计会带来严重的后果。中国会利用指责中国的论调和美国"重返亚洲"的战略当成美国敌视中国的证据，并将中国的经济问题算到美国头上。而排外情绪会成为中国在困难时期能够继续挣扎的精神支柱。事实上，已经有许多中国人认为，中国与越南和菲律宾南海纷争的背后是美国在捣鬼。
这种对现实的了解上的断层造成的最大后果是美国会失去重新考虑对华政策、并为中国无法持续崛起准备好对策的机会。华盛顿的对话政策的核心是现状会持续，中共的统治在未来数十年都不会动摇。类似的华盛顿政策的假设在对前苏联、苏哈托的印尼、埃及的穆巴拉克和卡扎菲的利比亚时都出现过。华盛顿根深蒂固地低估那些看起来坚不可摧的独裁政权中发生改朝换代改变的可能性。
美国应该重新考虑对华政策的基础前提并认真思考出一套备用战略，一套基于在未来20年，中国便会衰落的战略。因为中国一旦衰落，整个亚洲的局势将会发生改变。北韩政权会在一夜之间崩溃，朝鲜半岛会统一。区域性的民主转型潮流会推翻越南和老挝的共产党政权。但是，最重大的，也是最不可知的是中国自身：有13亿人口且虚弱的，或正在衰落的中国是否能进行一场和平的民主转型？
当然，现在便认为中国政府无法进行调整而避免衰落还言之过早。美国不能忽略中国再次强大的可能性。但目前的种种迹象已经表明了中国的颓势，也为一场非常可能的大地震提供了无价的草蛇灰线。美国政策制定者如果误读了这些信息，将会重蹈覆辙，犯下另一个战略错误。
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译者 于 9/03/2012 08:45:00 上午 发布在 译者 上
Everything You Think You Know About China Is Wrong
Are we obsessing about its rise when we should be worried about its fall?
BY MINXIN PEI | AUGUST 29, 2012
For the last 40 years, Americans have lagged in recognizing the declining fortunes of their foreign rivals. In the 1970s they thought the Soviet Union was 10 feet tall -- ascendant even though corruption and inefficiency were destroying the vital organs of a decaying communist regime. In the late 1980s, they feared that Japan was going to economically overtake the United States, yet the crony capitalism, speculative madness, and political corruption evident throughout the 1980s led to the collapse of the Japanese economy in 1991.
Could the same malady have struck Americans when it comes to China? The latest news from Beijing is indicative of Chinese weakness: a persistent slowdown of economic growth, a glut of unsold goods, rising bad bank loans, a bursting real estate bubble, and a vicious power struggle at the top, coupled with unending political scandals. Many factors that have powered China's rise, such as the demographic dividend, disregard for the environment, supercheap labor, and virtually unlimited access to external markets, are either receding or disappearing.
Yet China's declining fortunes have not registered with U.S. elites, let alone the American public. President Barack Obama's much-hyped "pivot to Asia," announced last November, is premised on the continuing rise of China; the Pentagon has said that by 2020 roughly 60 percent of the Navy's fleet will be stationed in the Asia-Pacific region. Washington is also considering deployingsea-borne anti-missile systems in East Asia, a move reflecting U.S. worries about China's growing missile capabilities.
In the lead-up to the Nov. 6 U.S. presidential election, both Democrats and Republicans have emphasized perceived Chinese strength for reasons of both national security and political expediency. Democrats use China's growing economic might to call for more government investment in education and green technology. In late August, the Center for American Progress and the Center for the Next Generation, two left-leaning think tanks, released a report forecasting that China will have 200 million college graduates by 2030. The report (which also estimates India's progress in creating human capital) paints a grim picture of U.S. decline and demands decisive action. Republicans justify increasing defense spending in this era of sky-high deficits in part by citing predictions that China's military capabilities will continue to grow as the country's economy expands. The 2012 Republican Party platform, released in late August at the Republican National Convention, says, "In the face of China's accelerated military build-up, the United States and our allies must maintain appropriate military capabilities to discourage any aggressive or coercive behavior by China against its neighbors."
The disconnect between the brewing troubles in China and the seemingly unshakable perception of Chinese strength persists even though the U.S. media accurately cover China, in particular the country's inner fragilities. One explanation for this disconnect is that elites and ordinary Americans remain poorly informed about China and the nature of its economic challenges in the coming decades. The current economic slowdown in Beijing is neither cyclical nor the result of weak external demand for Chinese goods. China's economic ills are far more deeply rooted: an overbearing state squandering capital and squeezing out the private sector, systemic inefficiency and lack of innovation, a rapacious ruling elite interested solely in self-enrichment and the perpetuation of its privileges, a woefully underdeveloped financial sector, and mounting ecological and demographic pressures. Yet even for those who follow China, the prevailing wisdom is that though China has entered a rough patch, its fundamentals remain strong.
Americans' domestic perceptions influence how they see their rivals. It is no coincidence that the period in the 1970s and late 1980s when Americans missed signs of rivals' decline corresponded with intense dissatisfaction with U.S. performance (President Jimmy Carter's 1979 "malaise speech," for example). Today, a China whose growth rate is falling from 10 to 8 percent a year (for now) looks pretty good in comparison with an America where annual growth languishes at below 2 percent and unemployment stays above 8 percent. In the eyes of many Americans, things may be bad over there, but they are much worse here.
Perceptions of a strong and pushy China also persist because of Beijing's own behavior. The ruling Chinese Communist Party continues to exploit nationalist sentiments to bolster its credentials as the defender of China's national honor. Chinese state media and history textbooks have fed the younger generation such a diet of distorted, jingoistic facts, outright lies, and nationalist myths that it is easy to provoke anti-Western or anti-Japanese sentiments. Even more worrisome is Beijing's uncompromising stance on territorial disputes with America's key Asian allies, such as Japan and the Philippines. The risk that a contest over disputed maritime territories, especially in the South China Sea, could lead to real armed conflict makes many in the United States believe that they cannot let down their guard against China.
Sadly, this gap between the American perception of Chinese strength and the reality of Chinese weakness has real adverse consequences. Beijing will use China-bashing rhetoric and the strengthening U.S. defense posture in East Asia as ironclad evidence of Washington's unfriendliness. The Communist Party will blame the United States for its economic difficulties and diplomatic setbacks. Xenophobia could become an asset for a regime struggling for survival in hard times. Many Chinese already hold the United States responsible for the recent escalations in the South China Seadispute and think the United States goaded Hanoi and Manila into confrontation.
The most consequential effect of this disconnect is the loss of an opportunity both to rethink U.S. China policy and to prepare for possible discontinuity in China's trajectory in the coming two decades. The central pillar of Washington's China policy is the continuation of the status quo, a world in which the Communist Party's rule is assumed to endure for decades. Similar assumptions underpinned Washington's policies toward the former Soviet Union, Suharto's Indonesia, and more recently Hosni Mubarak's Egypt and Muammar al-Qaddafi's Libya. Discounting the probability of regime change in seemingly invulnerable autocracies has always been an ingrained habit in Washington.
The United States should reassess the basic premises of its China policy and seriously consider an alternative strategy, one based on the assumption of declining Chinese strength and rising probability of an unexpected democratic transition in the coming two decades. Should such a change come, the geopolitical landscape of Asia would transform beyond recognition. The North Korean regime would collapse almost overnight, and the Korean Peninsula would be reunified. A regional wave of democratic transitions would topple the communist regimes in Vietnam and Laos. The biggest and most important unknown, however, is about China itself: Can a weak or weakening country of 1.3 billion manage a peaceful transition to democracy?
It is of course premature to completely write off the Communist Party's capacity for adaptation and renewal. China could come roaring back in a few years, and the United States should not ignore this possibility. But the party's demise can't be ruled out, and the current signs of trouble in China have provided invaluable clues to such a highly probable seismic shift. U.S. policymakers would be committing another strategic error of historic proportions if they miss or misread them.
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