2012年11月27日星期二

阎学通:中国如何打败美国

阎学通 2012年11月28日

Edel Rodriguez

北京
随着中国对全球经济影响不断增长以及其军事能力日益增强,中美战略竞争在所难免。两国领导人都乐观地断言,这种竞争是可控的,不会引发威胁全球秩序的冲突。
大多数学者并没有这么乐观。从历史经验看,中国崛起无疑对美国构成了挑战。崛起的强国会在全球体系中追求更大权威,而走向衰落的强国鲜有不经过反抗就拱手让位的。悲观主义者可能认为,中美政治制度的差异增加了两国间爆发战争的可能性。
我以现实主义的眼光看待政治问题。西方学者把我的政治观点称为“鹰派”,其实我只不过是没有过份地高估道义在国际关系中的作用。现实主义并不认为政治家应该只关心军事和经济实力,而事实上是认为在政治大国的战略竞争中,道义具有关键作用,有时甚至可决定胜负。
这个结论是我研读了管子、孔子、荀子、孟子等中国古代政治思想家的著作之后的心得。他们著书立说于距今2000多年前的先秦时期,当时的中国尚未形成大一统的帝国,诸侯国为争夺领土彼此激烈厮杀。
这大概是中国产生思想的最好时期。各学派争夺思想主导地位和政治影响力。他们形成一个重要共识,即国际影响力的关键在于政治实力;而政治实力的重要来源是讲道义的领导。在条件许可的情况下,尽量遵循道义规范的统治者,往往能维持长期稳定的领导地位。
公元前221年,暴君秦始皇统一了中国,他短命的统治无法与汉武帝相比。后者将法家的现实主义和儒家的“软实力”相结合,自公元前140年到公元前86年统治中国长达50多年。
中国古代哲学家荀子认为,领导力有三种:王权、霸权和强权。王权在国内外赢得人心;依仗军事实力的强权,不可避免地到处树敌;霸权则介乎二者之间:他们不欺骗国内民众和国外盟友,但很少顾及道义,常常对非盟友动武。诸子百家普遍认为,王权在任何较量中都能胜过霸权和强权。
这些理论看似远离我们这个时代,但实际上却很符合于今天的现实。亨利・基辛格曾经告诉我,他也认为中国古代政治哲学比其它任何外国学说都更有可能成为中国未来外交政策的主导思想。
先秦时代的四分五裂状态与当今全球割裂的国际格局十分相似。先秦政治思想家们提出的治世良方也可供今天借鉴:单纯依靠军事或经济实力而缺乏道义的领导,这样的国家必将失败。
可惜的是,在经济决定论的时代,这种看法没有市场,各国政府不过是嘴上说说罢了。中国政府宣称,中国共产党的领导是中国经济奇迹的基础,但在与美国竞争中它强调的都是经济领域。在美国表现为,领导人将国家成就归功于自己的领导,将国家的失败推得一干二净。
两国政府都必须明白,这场对全球主导权的争夺,比的不是谁更能砸钱,而是谁更具政治领导力。
很多人错误地认为,中国只要大幅增加对外经援就能改善对外关系。然而用钱很难买到感情的,以金钱为基础建立起来的“友谊”是经不住困难考验的。
那中国如何才能赢在全球范围内赢得人心呢?按照中国古代哲学家的说法,必须始于国内。王权需要先在国内建立起大众满意的社会模式,然后才能产生感召国外效仿的作用。
这意味着中国的政策重心应该从以经济建设为中心转向以构建和谐社会为中心,消除目前巨大的贫富差距。同时,中国需要用传统道德取代拜金主义的意识形态,消除政治腐败,实现社会正义与公平。
美国仍是世界超级霸权,为了与美国竞争,中国需要向其他国家展示王权风范。强大的军事力量是霸权的基础,这可解释美国拥有众多盟国的原因。尽管奥巴马政府在阿富汗、伊拉克和利比亚都犯了战略错误,但其行动依然证明,美国有能力同时主导三场国际战争。相比之下,中国军队自1984年中越边界冲突后就再未卷入过战争。中国拥有实战经验的高级将领极少,普通士兵就更不用说了。
与中国相比,美国与世界其它国家的关系无论在数量上还是质量上都更胜一筹。美国有超过50个正式军事同盟国,而中国则一个都没有。只有朝鲜和巴基斯坦勉强称得上是中国的“准同盟”。前者在1961年与中国建立正式同盟,但两国已有几十年时间未举行过联合军演,也没有武器交易。中国和巴基斯坦拥有实质性军事合作,但两国并未签署具有约束力的正式军事同盟条约。
在中国崛起的过程中,为了营造友好的国际环境,中国需要发展比美国质量更高的外交和军事关系。任何世界领导国家都无法与每一个国家都保持友好关系,因此中美间竞争的焦点就是看谁有更多高质量的盟友。为了实现这一目标,中国必须为世界提供比美国道义水平更高的领导。
中国必须正视自己是一个正在崛起的大国,需要承担起与自己国际地位相一致的责任。美国在欧洲和波斯湾为一些弱小国家提供安全保护,这一点值得中国学习。在为弱小国家提供安全保护的问题上,中国需要与周边国家建立类似上海合作组织那样的地区安全机制。上合组织成员包括中国、俄罗斯和几个中亚国家。
政治上,中国应该从其贤能治国的传统中汲取营养。高级政府官员的选拔应考虑候选人的品德和智慧,而不能只看专业和行政能力。中国还应该打开大门,在世界范围内选拔符合标准的官员,从而提高执政水平。
公元7世纪到10世纪的唐朝是中国历史上最辉煌的时代之一,那时,大批外国人在朝廷身居要职。今天的中国也应该这么做,与美国竞争吸引外国人才移民中国。
下一个10年,中国的新领导人将是出自经历过文化大革命困苦的一代。这一代做事果断,很可能将政治原则置于物质利益之上。这些领导人必定会在世界舞台上发挥更重要的作用,向相对弱小的国家提供更多安全保护和经济支持。
这意味着中国将在政治、经济和科技领域同美国展开竞争。这种竞争可能导致外交紧张,但不太可能造成军事冲突。
这是因为未来的中美竞争不同于冷战时期的美苏竞争。中美双方都不需要通过代理人战争来保护各自的战略利益以及获取自然资源和技术。
中国提升国际领导地位的诉求与美国维持现有主导地位的努力,是一场零和博弈。这是一场关乎赢得民心的战争,人心向背最终将决定胜负。正如中国古代哲学家所预言的,行王道者王天下。
本文最初发表于2011年11月20日。
阎学通是清华大学当代国际关系研究院院长、博士生导师。本文最初用英文撰写,中文译文经阎学通本人审定。

——纽约时报

How China Can Defeat America


Beijing
WITH China’s growing influence over the global economy, and its increasing ability to project military power, competition between the United States and China is inevitable. Leaders of both countries assert optimistically that the competition can be managed without clashes that threaten the global order.
Most academic analysts are not so sanguine. If history is any guide, China’s rise does indeed pose a challenge to America. Rising powers seek to gain more authority in the global system, and declining powers rarely go down without a fight. And given the differences between the Chinese and American political systems, pessimists might believe that there is an even higher likelihood of war.
I am a political realist. Western analysts have labeled my political views “hawkish,” and the truth is that I have never overvalued the importance of morality in international relations. But realism does not mean that politicians should be concerned only with military and economic might. In fact, morality can play a key role in shaping international competition between political powers — and separating the winners from the losers.
I came to this conclusion from studying ancient Chinese political theorists like Guanzi, Confucius, Xunzi and Mencius. They were writing in the pre-Qin period, before China was unified as an empire more than 2,000 years ago — a world in which small countries were competing ruthlessly for territorial advantage.
It was perhaps the greatest period for Chinese thought, and several schools competed for ideological supremacy and political influence. They converged on one crucial insight: The key to international influence was political power, and the central attribute of political power was morally informed leadership. Rulers who acted in accordance with moral norms whenever possible tended to win the race for leadership over the long term.
China was unified by the ruthless king of Qin in 221 B.C., but his short-lived rule was not nearly as successful as that of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty, who drew on a mixture of legalistic realism and Confucian “soft power” to rule the country for over 50 years, from 140 B.C. until 86 B.C.
According to the ancient Chinese philosopher Xunzi, there were three types of leadership: humane authority, hegemony and tyranny. Humane authority won the hearts and minds of the people at home and abroad. Tyranny — based on military force — inevitably created enemies. Hegemonic powers lay in between: they did not cheat the people at home or cheat allies abroad. But they were frequently indifferent to moral concerns and often used violence against non-allies. The philosophers generally agreed that humane authority would win in any competition with hegemony or tyranny.
Such theories may seem far removed from our own day, but there are striking parallels. Indeed, Henry Kissinger once told me that he believed that ancient Chinese thought was more likely than any foreign ideology to become the dominant intellectual force behind Chinese foreign policy.
The fragmentation of the pre-Qin era resembles the global divisions of our times, and the prescriptions provided by political theorists from that era are directly relevant today — namely that states relying on military or economic power without concern for morally informed leadership are bound to fail.
Unfortunately, such views are not so influential in this age of economic determinism, even if governments often pay lip service to them. The Chinese government claims that the political leadership of the Communist Party is the basis of China’s economic miracle, but it often acts as though competition with the United States will be played out on the economic field alone. And in America, politicians regularly attribute progress, but never failure, to their own leadership.
Both governments must understand that political leadership, rather than throwing money at problems, will determine who wins the race for global supremacy.
Many people wrongly believe that China can improve its foreign relations only by significantly increasing economic aid. But it’s hard to buy affection; such “friendship” does not stand the test of difficult times.
How, then, can China win people’s hearts across the world? According to ancient Chinese philosophers, it must start at home. Humane authority begins by creating a desirable model at home that inspires people abroad.
This means China must shift its priorities away from economic development to establishing a harmonious society free of today’s huge gaps between rich and poor. It needs to replace money worship with traditional morality and weed out political corruption in favor of social justice and fairness.
In other countries, China must display humane authority in order to compete with the United States, which remains the world’s pre-eminent hegemonic power. Military strength underpins hegemony and helps to explain why the United States has so many allies. President Obama has made strategic mistakes in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, but his actions also demonstrate that Washington is capable of leading three foreign wars simultaneously. By contrast, China’s army has not been involved in any war since 1984, with Vietnam, and very few of its high-ranking officers, let alone its soldiers, have any battlefield experience.
America enjoys much better relations with the rest of the world than China in terms of both quantity and quality. America has more than 50 formal military allies, while China has none. North Korea and Pakistan are only quasi-allies of China. The former established a formal alliance with China in 1961, but there have been no joint military maneuvers and no arms sales for decades. China and Pakistan have substantial military cooperation, but they have no formal military alliance binding them together.
To shape a friendly international environment for its rise, Beijing needs to develop more high-quality diplomatic and military relationships than Washington. No leading power is able to have friendly relations with every country in the world, thus the core of competition between China and the United States will be to see who has more high-quality friends. And in order to achieve that goal, China has to provide higher-quality moral leadership than the United States.
China must also recognize that it is a rising power and assume the responsibilities that come with that status. For example, when it comes to providing protection for weaker powers, as the United States has done in Europe and the Persian Gulf, China needs to create additional regional security arrangements with surrounding countries according to the model of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — a regional forum that includes China, Russia and several central Asian countries.
And politically, China should draw on its tradition of meritocracy. Top government officials should be chosen according to their virtue and wisdom, and not simply technical and administrative ability. China should also open up and choose officials from across the world who meet its standards, so as to improve its governance.
The Tang dynasty — which lasted from the 7th century to the 10th and was perhaps China’s most glorious period — employed a great number of foreigners as high-ranking officials. China should do the same today and compete with America to attract talented immigrants.
OVER the next decade, China’s new leaders will be drawn from a generation that experienced the hardships of the Cultural Revolution. They are resolute and will most likely value political principles more than material benefits. These leaders must play a larger role on the world stage and offer more security protection and economic support to less powerful countries.
This will mean competing with the United States politically, economically and technologically. Such competition may cause diplomatic tensions, but there is little danger of military clashes.
That’s because future Chinese-American competition will differ from that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. Neither China nor America needs proxy wars to protect its strategic interests or to gain access to natural resources and technology.
China’s quest to enhance its world leadership status and America’s effort to maintain its present position is a zero-sum game. It is the battle for people’s hearts and minds that will determine who eventually prevails. And, as China’s ancient philosophers predicted, the country that displays more humane authority will win.
Yan Xuetong, the author of “Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power,” is a professor of political science and dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University. 

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